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This paper evaluates achievements and shortcomings of the Lisbon Strategy launched by the 
European Union in the spring of 2000 aiming to increase the competitiveness of the European 
economy within ten years. A careful examination of the Strategy’s pros and cons shows that its 
general rationale was sound and helpful despite an incorrect and naive political call to economi-
cally outperform the rest of the world in such period. The main priorities of the Strategy: promoting 
growth through creating more and better jobs and developing the knowledge base of the economy, 
remain valid for today and for the future. However, it has to be underlined that implementing de-
sired changes requires time. At the moment, it is crucial to accomplish structural reforms, which 
have significant impact on job creation, business performance and growth. Among them, it is es-
sential to complete the Single Market, still limited by many administrative barriers. The paper 
shows main areas of necessary improvements to be undertaken by the Community and the mem-
ber states. To strengthen real ownership of the Lisbon process, politicians must change their think-
ing from short-term and national to long-term and beneficial for the entire Community. Only such 
committed leadership can persuade the citizens to support the reforms, aiming to build a common 
European public good. Exploring these ideas would be a desirable return to the basic concept of 
the European Community, shaped by its founding fathers short after the World War II.  
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1. Introduction 
The Lisbon Strategy launched by the European Union in 2000 was designed to increase the 
growth and modernize Europe, making its economy more competitive. The Strategy aimed to 
achieve success through increasingly intensive participation of knowledge-based economy in the 
overall development (research, education, access to information technology) with the concurrent 
improvement in functioning of a single European market, support for entrepreneurship and 
strengthening of sound macroeconomic frameworks. The necessary actions to accomplish such 
goals comprised of intensive efforts in raising the level and broadening the scope of education and 
a constant closing of the social exclusion gap. 
The Strategy acknowledged that in the age of information society sustainable growth could be 
achieved only through high employment levels in all social groups combined with a continuing in-
crease in labor productivity. The inclusion of possibly highest number of people into the labor mar-
ket was rightly seen as the best tool for combating poverty. Other social goals were supposed to 
indirectly lead to a better implementation of the Strategy. Greater care for natural environment was 
seen as contributing to higher growth and better quality of life in a longer term. Such goals were 
declared to be of primary importance to all European Union countries, although their implementa-
tion would depend on the policy of individual states. Special tools, particularly the new open 
method of co-ordination (OMC), were designed to monitor the progress of the Strategy and provide 
multilateral support in its implementation. 
Today, when the Strategy has reached a midterm point, we already know that some of its am-
bitious ideas cannot be put into practice, at least not in the planned implementation period of 10 
years. The most spectacular goal of the Strategy remains out of reach: closing the economic gap 
between Europe and the Unites States and consequently advancing ahead of the US. Many ask 
whether this goal was correctly defined at the onset of reforms. Can we justify opposing the Euro-
pean identity “against others” instead of stressing Europe’s huge potential in the global competition 
(Ash 2005)? Hence, a careful review of the Strategy’s objectives is in order: only then we might 
answer the question, which goals remain important and topical and where the Strategy’s ambitions 
were wrongly directed. 
2. The Lisbon strategic objectives and their justification 
The Lisbon Strategy (LS) was launched at the European summit in March 2000. Its overall ob-
jective was to transform the European Union (EU) into “the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion” by 2010 (European Commission 2000). Through it, the European 
leaders envisioned the EU as a future economic “superpower”, which would concurrently keep or 
even raise the level of its inherited social commitments.  
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To make the Strategy politically attractive, the argument of economic catching up and outper-
forming the US was raised. This idea was, in the view of this paper’s author, overly inflated not only 
from today’s perspective but also while looking back at the circumstances at the time of the LS 
launching. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe was steadily in the process of catching 
up with the US, in terms of raising per capita income and faster growing productivity but the dis-
tance to the American levels of life standard remained high. In the mid 1990s this convergence 
process came to an end with the US strong productivity growth outperforming the diminishing dy-
namics of the EU productivity. Together with the constantly weaker employment performance in 
Europe, the gap in income and output between the US and EU could not be closed while the dis-
tance between them started to grow even faster (Lenain 2005; Bützow Mogensen 2005). 
Figure 1: Labor productivity per hour growth: Euro Area versus US Real GDP divided by total hours 












Source: Lenain, P. (2005), p.29
1 (data from OECD). 
This growing gap threatened Europe’s ability to compete on the global market. What is even 
more important for the citizens, the situation should have (and must have) raised doubts of the abil-
ity of the EU governments to keep their social commitments in time of weak economic results. The 
EU leaders should have warned their constituencies that maintaining living standards at appropri-
ate levels was in danger and that the LS was an answer to this threat. Instead, they directed their 
attention toward “beating” the US and made several promises on preserving and further developing 
the social model regardless of the economic performance of the EU economies. 
However, one should take into consideration that the overall economic climate in Europe at the 
beginning of the new century quite differed from today and there were many reasons for optimism. 
In 2000 Europe was in the seventh year of an upswing, the average annual growth exceeded 3% 
and the expectations for the future were exorbitant. The progress in building the “new economy” in 
Europe was remarkable and the successes of the IT-based economy in the US provided a good 
example to follow. Probably, this overall optimistic climate convinced the authors of the LS to set 
goals, which proved too ambitious and overly hopeful. Clearly, visible threats were overlooked. 
                                                  
1  Available under http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/4977816_rc58.pdf.  
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Favorable conditions changed rapidly. Short after the Lisbon summit the “technology bubble” 
burst, the terrorist attacks of 9.11.2001 followed, corporate scandals (Enron, World Com) came 
into public scrutiny, the appreciation of Euro against the US dollar was apparent and oil prices 
were high and volatile. A period of recession and business failures set in. The decline of the annual 
growth of the EU countries between 2000 and 2004 (1.4 % in average, notably less than in the US 
economy, which was 2.5%) followed the drop in output (Lenain 2005; Bützow Mogensen 2005). 
The report prepared in November 2004 by the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (High 
Level Group 2004) for the mid-term review of the LS is considerably more realistic in its assess-
ment of the relative position of the European economy and its future prospects. It clearly shows 
that stronger economic growth and more employment are necessary for the preservation of the 
European social model. The need for securing financial resources for future pensions and social 
benefits is, according to the report, even more acute because of the fast aging structure of the 
European societies. Hence, the social cohesion objectives have to be balanced with the available 
economic resources. 
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Source: High Level Group (2004), p. 14. 
Thus we arrive at the second point of the discussion on the nature of the LS objectives. The 
Strategy tried to apply an innovative approach to development in which economic and social objec-
tives were not opposed to each other but were intertwined. According to its authors, not only the 
implementation of the economic objectives might feedback support and strength to the social ob-
jectives, but also the implementation of social objectives could be expected to boost economic 
growth. Among the social cohesion objectives defined by the LS, there is actually a group of tasks 
which, if achieved, may result in growth. First of all, the goal to secure high, better qualified em-
ployment ensures more social cohesion and at the same time leads to a higher economic growth. 
Similarly, the goal of providing broad, life-long education for young and old („investing in people”) 
supports both economic growth and social inclusion. 
On the other hand, there are examples of social cohesion or environmental goals, which 
clearly increase the cost factor of the economy and can hardly be seen as supporting economic 
growth. These goals should be clearly defined as social or political goals aiming at more equality,  
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less income differentiation or easier access to certain public goods. Their expected costs should be 
estimated and included in the „bill” at the spending side of the Strategy. 
While the LS from the beginning declared the need for modernizing social protection systems, 
no concrete recommendations for this reform have been formulated
2. There was also a lack of 
critical assessment of the European social model in terms of its financial sustainability. 
At this point, a short review of the initial and the later defined objectives of the Lisbon Strategy 
may be of use. At the outset, the Lisbon strategy consisted of three main strategic directions: 
•  preparing the transition to a knowledge economy and society by better policies toward R&D , 
by stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by 
completing the internal market; 
•  modernizing the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion; 
•  sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favorable growth prospects by applying an appro-
priate macro-economic policy mix (European Commission 2000). 
In the subsequent years, the European Council’s meetings (Stockholm 2001, Gothenburg 
2001, Barcelona 2002 and Brussels 2003) supplemented the initial list with additional objectives 
(for example, environmental protection), broadened the existing sub-goals and tried to spell them 
out in a more precise way
3. 
3. The tasks and targets 
Taking a closer look at the more concrete tasks defined within this process, we can group 
them in five main policy areas: 
• employment  growth; 
•  knowledge economy and knowledge society development; 
•  structural economic reforms; 
• social  cohesion; 
• environment. 
The tasks, appropriate to each of the listed policy areas have been shortly defined as follows: 
Employment growth: improving the employability, reducing skill gaps, particularly of unem-
ployed people, increasing adaptability through lifelong learning, more flexible working time and or-
ganization, increasing employment in services, increasing employment of women by creating equal 
opportunities and more family friendly work places. 
Knowledge economy and knowledge society development: securing access of all households, 
schools and businesses to an inexpensive, world class communications infrastructure, broad popu-
larization of computer skills among citizens, Internet in each school. Development of e-governance 
and e-banking (including the preparation and enforcement of needed legislation for electronic 
                                                  
2  Besides some vague remarks on adjusting the systems of social protection to the knowledge economy, ensuring that 
work pays, promoting social inclusion and gender equality and providing quality health services. 
3    These objectives can be found on the web site of the European Commission at the following link: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/index_en.html.  
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commerce, telecoms liberalization). Adjusting the educational systems to the needs of information 
society, raising the share of tertiary and secondary education among young people, creating a 
friendly environment for starting up and developing innovative business, especially SMEs, estab-
lishment of the European Area of Research and Innovation – starting from networking among na-
tional and joint research programs, improving the environment for private research investment, 
R&D partnerships and high-technology start-ups, facilitating the mobility of researchers, imple-
menting the Community patent. 
Structural economic reforms: completing the fully operational internal market, especially re-
moving barriers to services, speeding up liberalization in network services (electricity, gas, trans-
port, postal services), implementing an on-line procurement system for the entire EU, simplifying 
the regulatory environment for enterprises, promoting competition and reducing the general level of 
state aid shifting the emphasis from supporting individual companies and sectors towards horizon-
tal objectives; also, completing of the internal market for financial services. In the area of macro-
economic policies the commitments included: fiscal consolidation, raising the quality and sustain-
ability of public finance, redirecting public expenditure toward capital accumulation and R&D. 
Social cohesion and modernizing the social model: making work pay, promoting social inclu-
sion and gender equality, providing quality health standards, counteracting the risk of social exclu-
sion due to the lack of modern communication and work skills in specific groups. 
A strategy for sustainable development: this dimension was added to the LS at the Gothenburg 
summit in 2001 and at subsequent meetings of the European Council. It includes among others a 
more responsible management of natural resources, maintaining maritime security, combating the 
climate change and other environmental priorities for sustainable development. 
4. Measures and methods of implementation 
In order to measure and monitor the progress of the LS, a system of structural indicators has 
been developed by the Commission. At the outset, 107 such structural indicators have been de-
fined (Royuela-Mora at all 2005). Eventually, for presentation reasons, the European Council 
adopted a set of 14 quantitative targets measured by appropriate indicators. These quantitative 
targets included: 
•  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) 
•  Labor productivity per person employed (GDP per person employed in PPS) 
•  Employment rate (employed persons aged 15-64 as a share of the total population of the same 
age group);*
4 
•  Employment rate of older workers (employed persons aged 55-64 as a share of the population 
of the same age group);* 
•  Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD); 
                                                  
4  Indicators marked with 
* are additionally disaggregated by gender.  
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•  Youth educational attainment level* (percentage of the population aged 20-24 having com-
pleted at least upper secondary education); 
•  Comparative price levels (final consumption by private households including indirect taxes); 
•  Business investment (Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP); 
•  At-risk-poverty rate* (Share of persons with a disposable income, after social transfers, below 
60% of the national median); 
•  Dispersion of regional employment rates* (coefficient of variation of employment across re-
gions within countries); 
•  Total long-term unemployment rate* (Long-term – 12 months or longer- unemployed, as a per-
centage of total active population aged 15-64); 
•  Total greenhouse gas emissions (percentage in change of emission of 6 main greenhouse 
gases since base year); 
•  Energy intensity of the economy (Gross inland consumption of energy divided by GDP); 
•  Transport Volume of freight transport relative to GDP
5. 
The transposition of general goals of the LS to concrete activities and technical tasks led to an 
overloaded agenda that could not be easily managed. At the same time, the use of slimmed-down 
set of structural indicators excessively simplified the core targets that should have been investi-
gated in a more multidimensional way. For instance, the measurement of the knowledge economy 
issue, which is of central importance for the overall Strategy, was almost left out from the list of 14 
main indicators (only 2 indicators were left). Some analysts raised the question whether the cover-
age of the main objectives by a „short list” of structural indicators was sufficient for the assessment 
of the strategy’s multidimensional progress (Royuela-Mora at all 2005). In the end, the „machinery” 
of the LS monitoring and implementation after defining all its tasks became too complex to oversee 
and operate. One may suspect that this happened not only due to the bureaucratic nature of the 
process but also because of political tensions within the Lisbon agenda. 
The Lisbon Strategy has been equipped with two kinds of instruments to pursue its objectives. 
The first one is the traditional community method (the European Commission proposes drafts of 
regulations, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopt them, the member states 
are responsible for the implementation). This method is to be used in areas where the EU has legal 
competence, notably in most important and strategic issues, such as the implementation of the 
single internal market, the European Patent, competition and state aid rules or the integration of 
financial markets in Europe. 
The second instrument was created to be adopted in areas of need for common action where 
the Community has limited or no legal competence. Examples for such areas are labor market or 
business climate issues as well as most measures linked to the implementation of the „knowledge 
                                                  
5  More detailed information on the nature of the general and detailed indicators and discussion on their coverage and 
appropriateness can be found in Royuela-Mora at all (2005).  
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economy”. This method, called the open method of coordination (OMC), is a loose framework for 
cooperation and coordination using the following tools: 
•  setting guidelines for the EU, combined with timetables for achieving goals; 
•  establishing quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks for measuring the progress 
(tailored to the needs of respective countries and sectors); 
•  translating European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets 
and adopting appropriate measures; 
•  conducting periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer reviews in order to promote mutual learn-
ing (Bützow Mogensen 2005). 
Since the OMC method is based on a voluntary participation of the member states and is not 
armed with any legal sanction, it can use only informal means of enforcement (so called „blaming 
and shaming”). It is highly flexible and therefore can be easily adjusted to the nature of the dis-
cussed area
6. A similar method has been applied earlier, under the so called Luxembourg process 
of employment policy and the Cardiff process of product and capital market reform. The method 
has been formalized at the Lisbon summit for the first time. 
5. Accomplishments and delays 
When looking at the overall economic performance of Europe since 2000, especially having in 
mind the most exposed promise of the Lisbon Strategy to outperform the US and becoming the 
most competitive knowledge economy, it becomes obvious that the Strategy did not live up to such 
high expectations. The distance between Europe and the fastest growing economies in the world 
(in terms of per capita income level, GDP dynamics or productivity growth) had not diminished 
since the LS inception; on the contrary, the gap widened. The Lisbon summit envisaged an aver-
age annual growth rate for the EU at 3% while the real growth was less then 2%. The GDP per 
head is in the three largest EU countries
7 30% lower than in the US (OECD 2005). The chief 
economist of the OECD had recently noted: ”before overtaking America, the first, very ambitious 
objective, should be to stop Europe’s relative decline. This will be hard enough to achieve over the 
next few years...” (Cotis 2005). Can the disappointing economic performance of Europe be suffi-
cient evidence that the entire concept of the Strategy was a mistake? 
                                                  
6  The discussion of issues linked with the implementation of the OMC method can be found in Bützow Mogensen 2005. 
The criticism of this method is provided in Notre Europe 2005. 
7  Germany, France and Italy.  
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Note: Growth of real GDP in composition to the same quarter in the proceeding year. 
Source: Eurostat. 
It is difficult to assess the accomplishments of the Lisbon Strategy within five years of its adop-
tion. One reason might be an unexpected negative turn in the global economic environment, which 
occurred just after the Strategy’s announcement and resulted in a long lasting recession. More-
over, most of the strategy’s objectives aim at structural changes and thus have a long term per-
spective. Numerous activities undertaken within the LS framework will yield effects only in the fu-
ture. Enough time has passed, however, to attempt assessing whether the Strategy’s assumptions 
have been duly followed and to what outcome. Starting with the main targets of the LS, described 
above, we can report as follows, looking at the entire European Union: 
5.1. Employment 
Visible progress has been made in employment growth, though not enough to meet the Strat-
egy’s objectives. The aggregate employment rate was expected to reach 70% in 2010. It has risen 
from 63.4% in 2000 to 64.4 % in 2003, which equals 6 million more employed then before. The 
achievement of 70% in 2010 is not likely for entire Europe but a slowly growing trend is expected
8. 
By 2003 good progress has been achieved (4 percentage points) in employment rate of older 
workers (aged 55- 64). The planned indicator was an increase to 50% although the one achieved 
so far - 41.7%. Also, the employment rate of female workers rose by 2 percentage points to 56.1% 
and the planned rate of 60% in 2010 is still possible to reach. The long-term unemployment was 
reduced from 4% in 1999 to 3% in 2003 (European Commission 2004: Delivering Lisbon). It should 
be mentioned, that the overall employment’s target set for 2010 was fully reached already in 2003 
in 4 EU 15 countries and the female employment rate was at that time achieved in 7 countries 
(European Commission 2005a). Creating 6 million more jobs in a time of recession is indeed an 
achievement and encouragement. However, it is important to note that most of the new jobs have 
                                                  
8  There is a new undocumented information that the overall employment rate in Europe in 2005 reached the level of 
67% and the employment rate of women – 57%. If this information proved to be correct, this would be a very positive 
trend. 
Average growth rate 
projected at Lisbon  
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been directed at low-skilled workers. OECD is of the opinion that liberalization of the labor markets 
and particularly changes in employment protection legislation need to be further elaborated, being 
essential in achieving more employment (Cotis 2005). 
5.2. Information society: ICT, education, research and innovation 
Another area of visible progress is the broad use of ICT (information and communication tech-
nologies), such as computers, e-government and the Internet. In 2002, already 93% of European 
schools and 47% households had access to the Internet. 45% of basic services of local govern-
ments were available on-line (European Commission 2005a). 
Also, there has been a rapid progress in the popular use of other modern technologies, such 
as broadband and 3G (third generation mobile telephones). The EU spending on IT in 2003 stood 
at 3 per cent of GDP (in the US – 3.6%). Yet in the overall use of new technologies the EU lags 
behind the world leaders (Centre for European Reform 2004). Besides, the relatively large invest-
ments in ICT have not yet been translated into a strong increase in labor productivity, as it hap-
pened in the US economy. Some authors argue that there was not sufficient use of ICT in service 
sectors, such as wholesale and retail trade, or financial services (Bützow Mogensen 2005). This 
may result from insufficient liberalization of the service sector in Europe. However, it should be 
mentioned here, that some EU countries (particularly Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and Finland) 
achieved leading world position in the development and use of new technologies. 
In terms of educational objectives, the attainment of upper-secondary schools by young people 
(20-24 years old), reached 73.5% (in comparison to the 85% target), which can be assessed as 
moderate success. Spending on R&D achieved in 2002 an average of 1.99% of GDP (whereas the 
target for 2010 was 3%)
9. R&D spending of private business was expected to rise and even become 
dominant. Instead, it reached an average of 56% of all spending while the target for 2010 was 2/3. 
The target of 3% spending on R&D was criticized as overly ambitious and not realistic. OECD 
pointed out that this objective was out of reach for most EU countries and that the EU should rather 
focus on improving the effectiveness of a lower R&D spending (OECD Economic Surveys 2003). 
Yet the Commission is determined to achieve this objective by encouraging the member states to 
support R&D, changing the rules of state aid in favor of R&D and participating more with its own 
financial means in R&D spending. 
Some progress has been observed in the development of the European Research Area but 
there is still insufficient progress in the innovation record of the EU. A basic agreement has been 
reached in 2004 on the Community Patent (the original deadline was 2001) but it will not be fully 
put in practice before 2010(Centre for European Reform 2004). According to the Commission’s 
own data, the EU is ahead of the US in only one of the 12 innovation indicators: the number of sci-
ence and technology graduates (European Commission 2003). However, many of these graduates 
choose to work outside Europe because of better working conditions and pay. The overall picture 
                                                  
9  The spending for R&D achieved at that time in Japan 3.06% of GDP and in the US 2.67 %(Centre for European Re-
form 2004).In 2003, the R&D indicator for EU was unchanged.(European Commission 2005a).  
Studies & Analyses No. 310 – Barbara Błaszczyk – The Lisbon Strategy: a Tool for Economic… 
of R&D in Europe is rather discouraging but it must be underscored that some countries, especially 
Sweden and Finland, achieved large success in this area and outperformed the US economy in 
such indicators as R&D spending in GDP or number of patents per one million people. 
5.3. Structural economic reforms and the single market 
The two broad areas of Employment and Information Society, discussed above, are supported 
by the OMC method; in these areas most progress depends on the individual activities of the 
Member Countries. The issues of the structural reforms and especially of the single market belong 
to the competences of the Community and are resolved by its legal means. More progress could 
be expected in this area. 
The single market, which was introduced in 1992, has brought a substantial success. Studies 
have shown that the first ten years of its implementation (not including the telecom and electricity 
markets) have led to 1.4% higher growth of GDP and 0.9% additional growth in employment 
(European Commission 2005a). The implementation of the Lisbon Strategy has added some visi-
ble progress in this field. Important markets have been entirely or partially liberalized during the 
time under discussion. This concerns the telecom sector, transport, postal services, the electricity 
and gas markets. But the overall single European market is still not completed and the slow pro-
gress in this field is disappointing. 
5.4. Progress in network industries 
The liberalization of the telecom sector was largely successful, resulting in doubling of the 
number of operators providing fixed-line services and a substantial fall of consumer prices (by 
13.5% in the last five years). However, in recent years, there was a slow-down of these positive 
trends, with the former state monopolists regaining their shares in the market, competition declin-
ing and prices rising (Centre for European Reform 2004). 
The progress in opening the energy markets was much slower. The deadlines for liberalization 
of gas and electricity sectors have been agreed only at the end of 2002 and a year later the EU 
established an energy regulators group. The member states started to liberalize wholesale energy 
markets. The deadline for full liberalization for industrial users passed in 2004, but for consumers it 
has been delayed until 2007 (from the original date of 2005). Hence, the prices for the consumers 
fell less then for the industrial users (Centre for European Reform 2004). Other efforts of the 
Commission aimed at securing energy supply and encouraging efficient use of energy, also 
through cross-border electricity supply connections
10. 
In transport, there was a substantial progress in 2004 in opening the air transportation for 
competition („the open sky” project). At the same time, measures were taken to increase the cross 
                                                  
10   For 2005 the target was set at 10% for cross-border energy transmission relatively to installed production capacity 
(European Commission 2005a).  
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border competition in rail services. The entire liberalization of rail transport was declared for 2008. 
Attempts in liberalizing port services were so far unsuccessful. 
5.4. Low integration of the single market 
Despite visible achievements in liberalization of the network industries and establishing a 
common regulation of financial services, there is still too little progress in accomplishing the single 
market. Lack of progress shows in the shrinking intra-EU trade (especially since 2001) and very 
high price divergences among countries and regions (High Level Group 2004). Additionally, only 
few Community directives have been included in the national law. According to the Commissions’ 
data, only 58.3% of the 40 directives that had to be transposed by the end of 2004 actually became 
national legislation, and only 7 out of 40 were correctly implemented by all Member States (Notre 
Europe 2005)
11. 
5.5. Delays in the services sector 
The most significant shortcoming in the implementation of the single market rules can be found 
in the services sector, which has been almost completely excluded from competition. As the report 
of the Wim Kok group states, the services sector accounts for 70% of GDP growth in the EU and 
was responsible for the creation of most new work places between 1998 and 2002. Yet services 
account only for 20% of trade. The level of intra-EU trade in services has not increased since 1992, 
whereas the intra-EU trade in goods has increased by one third and has added 1.8 per cent to the 
EU GDP every year. A Commission survey in 2002 found 91 different barriers to cross-border 
trade in services (Barroso 2005). As a result, the service market is very fragmented, underin-
vested, has low productivity and is not able to create new jobs. But the growth potential in this sec-
tor is huge. A study prepared by the Copenhagen Economics estimates that the removal of obsta-
cles to the freedom of establishment and to the free movement for service providers could lead to 
an increase of total employment of 0.3% in the medium run (around 600,000), the increase of real 
wage by 0.4 % and the decline of prices of 7.2% in the regulated professions (European Commis-
sion 2005b). 
The European Commission accepted in 2004 a Services Directive dedicated to opening the 
services market (the so-called Bolkestein directive). Since this directive has recently been as-
sessed as politically controversial, the European Parliament and the new Commission are as-
sumed to propose changes to it, which would enable its adoption. It seems that there is a strong 
commitment on the part of the Commission to implement the freedom of services as soon as pos-
sible and to remove political obstacles blocking this freedom (Barroso 2005). But the resistance 
against these changes in some countries
12 is very strong, too. 
                                                  
11   The worst performers were France, Germany and Greece. 
12   Especially in France and Germany.  
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5.6. Other obstacles in the free movement of goods and in the business climate 
Certain obstacles impede the free movement of goods; for example, slow development of 
technical standards hinders the functioning of the general principle of mutual recognition. Such and 
other obstacles cost the European economy 150 billion Euro yearly (High Level Group 2004) which 
calls for urgent attention. 
Good progress in the liberalization of public tenders for goods and services must be noted. Pub-
lic procurement accounts for 16% of the EU GDP every year and its efficiency is important both for 
the public finance and for the business. But the Commission estimates that only around 16 per cent 
of all procurement contracts are published in the EU journals (Centre for European Reform 2004). 
A visible but still insufficient progress has been achieved in the business climate. The regula-
tory environment of the enterprises needs many improvements and the costs of a company set-up 
and business operation are still too high. Removing these obstacles calls for not only less regula-
tion but also for its higher quality. The quality of the legislative process at the countries and the 
Community levels should be improved and the economic evaluation of the legislation prior to its 
adoption should be introduced (High Level Group 2004) 
6. Implementation of the Strategy: differences across countries 
It should be emphasized that the progress in the implementation of the LS significantly differed 
among countries. There were groups of definitely better performing countries set against decisively 
worse performing ones. 
The progress achieved by countries depended on the level of departure and since that level 
differed, relative progress needs to be assessed. The progress and level achieved by individual 
countries are compared every year by the Commission using the structural indicators and are as-
sessed by the European Council at its spring meetings. Starting in 2004 these assessments in-
clude also the new accession countries. Moreover, the Centre for European Reform delivers its 
own assessment every spring, based on independent score boards, such as the „Global competi-
tiveness report” of the World Economic Forum. Royuela and others (2005) delivered an economet-
ric study on the relative progress of all countries in the Lisbon process. 
According to the reports mentioned above, the best performers in general were the Nordic 
countries: Sweden, Denmark and Finland. They score well in almost every aspect of the Lisbon 
agenda. They have achieved high growth and employment on the one hand and high levels of 
competitiveness (innovations, R&D) on the other, without giving up the environmental goals and 
social obligations. 
The second best group includes the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland and Austria. These countries 
are very committed to the Lisbon goals and they achieved good scores in some, but not all areas. 
For example, the UK achieved a very good assessment on the liberalization of telecoms and, fi-
nancial services. Ireland has made very good progress in raising its employment and productivity 
levels and in introducing good education policies and business climate. It has achieved the highest  
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productivity level in Europe, while it is lagging behind in innovation record and poverty rate. The 
Netherlands has noted successes in liberalization of telecoms and utilities and good employment 
policies. Austria was successful in modernizing the social protection system and has achievements 
in the natural environment protection (Centre for European Reform 2004 and 2005, Royuela-Mora 
and all 2005). 
Greece, Spain and Portugal have a relatively poor position for most indicators but they at least 
tried to carry out some reforms. Remaining countries are positioning themselves somewhere „in 
between”, having progressed in some areas and stalled in others. Among them, of special impor-
tance are the two largest and most influential European countries: Germany and France. They 
have been often criticized as anti-reform but since 2003 they have both shown remarkable efforts 
to introduce difficult and unpopular reforms. In the case of France it is the pension reform and at-
tempts to make the 35 hours working week more flexible. Germany introduced a comprehensive 
labor market reform (Agenda 2010) which includes serious cuts of unemployment benefits, loosen-
ing of employment protection laws and a reform of labor agencies. Thus, one can conclude, that 
almost every country in EU-15 has embarked on reforms that are directed to more growth and 
competitiveness. Even Greece and Portugal, the laggards in many reform areas, have achieved 
success in at least one Lisbon objective. Only Italy, the third largest country in Europe remains in-
different toward Lisbon goals and even appears to be sliding backwards (Centre for European Re-
forms 2004, 2005). 
However, it should be added, that independently from the Lisbon agenda, a clearly visible 
catching-up of poorer countries toward the more developed ones took place at the end of the 
1990s’ and at the beginning of the new millennium. Countries which started from lower values of 
employment rate have experienced the highest growth rates of employment. This was the case of 
Spain and Italy. They have maintained rapid job creation which translates into high GDP per capita 
growth rates. Other group of countries (Ireland, Greece, Finland and Luxemburg) had a high GDP 
growth without a dynamic employment growth. High growth rates in R&D expenditures and high 
increase in youth educational attainments have not necessarily led to a similarly high GDP per cap-
ita growth (Royuela-Mora 2005). These records show that the economic mechanism does not 
automatically translate different factors into growth. The effects depend also on the relative situa-
tion of each country, its phase of development and the most important growth factors in this phase. 
In other words, less developed countries access and exploit more easily available resources before 
they move to the phase of the knowledge economy. 
Having in mind the less developed countries one should examine the performance of the new 
ten EU member states. Most of them (besides Malta and Cyprus) are the former Central European 
and Baltic countries, which experienced a difficult transition from real socialism to market economy 
lasting even 15 years. There were different opinions on how these countries will influence the per-
formance of Europe and particularly the achievement of the Lisbon goals. It was evident that, in 
comparison to the EU15, these countries are much poorer, have lower income and productivity 
levels and still have serious problems in restructuring their industries and securing social cohesion. 
Thus, they also have a strong potential for catching up and are more dynamic and flexible. In the  
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second year of their assessment, the performance of these countries against the Lisbon criteria 
showed to be surprisingly good. Not only all these new member states have a much higher GDP 
growth than the old members but some of them are very good performers in chosen Lisbon scores. 
For example, Slovenia, along with the Czech Republic and Estonia has very high ranks in the use 
of the new technology, R&D and information society. Estonia has reached a world leading position 
in using the new technologies (after Ireland) and has introduced very good regulations in state aid 
and competition policy. Latvia supplies the cheapest electricity in EU25, has the lowest state sub-
sidies, and ranks very well in competition policy and environmental protection. The Czech Republic 
has remarkable achievements in modernizing the social protection system, Hungary has devel-
oped highly friendly business environment and Poland recorded one of the highest levels of the 
private entrepreneurial activity of its population. Slovakia has been described as a „frontrunner” in 
implementing economic and regulatory reforms (such as removing administrative barriers for busi-
ness activity, liberalizing the labor protection laws and making the working hours more flexible) 
(Centre for European Reform 2005). Moreover, all former transition countries have lower corporate 
and personal taxes and many of them have introduced a pension reform. 
All these observations bring us to the conclusion that the EU enlargement in 2004 may con-
tribute to more competitiveness and more dynamic growth of Europe, leading to a better perform-
ance in the light of the Lisbon goals. The condition for such positive development would be, how-
ever, that the „old” EU members would not act against this dynamism and competitiveness, by 
building new barriers between them and the new member economies or by trying to make their 
regulations more rigid. 
7. Why some important Lisbon goals could not be accomplished? 
The answer to this question is multidimensional. The first dimension is contained in the ration-
ale of the Strategy and its ability to identify the most important barriers to growth and the most ap-
propriate measures to handle them. The second one lies in the construction of the Strategy, in 
terms of cohesion and interconnection of its different goals and in setting right priorities. The third 
dimension hides in the quality of implementation, including cooperation methods, leadership and 
ownership of reforms by member countries. The last but not least dimension is in the political 
economy of reforms. 
7.1. Rationale and construction 
From today’s perspective, it would be correct to say that the general aim of the LS at its start-
ing point was a good and helpful proposal. Taking into consideration the slowing dynamics of 
growth and productivity of the European economy in comparison with other fast growing parts of 
the world and observing its aging population, the Strategy was looking for new sources of growth 
that could secure more competitiveness, economic development and social security in the future.  
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Such new sources were primarily seen in the fast development of the knowledge economy that 
was expected to produce higher value added of outputs and, at the same time, raise the productiv-
ity of the main production factors. However, it has been overlooked that such structural changes 
cannot be implemented quickly but need many years for accomplishment and are really costly. The 
expectations to have very quick results brought disappointment, particularly for countries, which 
were less developed. 
The parallel objective of raising employment was based on a correct consideration that Euro-
pean working force is underemployed, predominantly because it is spending too little of their lives 
at work and is working too few hours. There is clear evidence, that these are the main reasons of 
lower growth in Europe than in the US (see Figure 4). Thus, supporting the job creation was and 
continues to be an especially justified task of the Strategy. Many other Strategy goals were seen 
as means to accelerate growth and employment (for instance the opening of markets, the imple-
menting of better business environment and the shaping of sound macro-economic rules). Other 
goals (on social cohesion or environment) were also formulated as growth supporting aims, al-
though not all of them could be rightly classified as such, as was mentioned earlier. 
















The first column shows the difference in productivity, the second adds the effects of shorter working time and the third – 
the effects of lower employment rate. The entire gap is 27%. 
 
Source: Bützow Mogensen (2005), p.51 
 
The symbolic goal of outperforming the US and other parts of the world showed to be least jus-
tified and brought more confusion then benefits to the stakeholders of the Strategy, the European 
citizens and their neighbors. After five years of Strategy implementation, the main popular interest 
is in reasons due to which this „race” has not been won and not in the causes why real progress of 
the member countries along the Strategy’s guidelines has not been achieved. Opposing Europe to 
other parts of the world instead of promoting fruitful cooperation was the mistaken idea, which has 
additionally neglected the fact that the openness of the European economy could be an additional 
source of economic growth. Today, in our opinion, there is already a changed understanding of 
these causalities. 
Overall, however, the rationale behind the Strategy seems to have been justified and correct. 
  
Studies & Analyses No. 310 – Barbara Błaszczyk – The Lisbon Strategy: a Tool for Economic… 
The more difficult problem arises with the assessment of the internal cohesion of the strategy 
and the choice of its priorities. The recent criticism of the Wim Kok report underlines that „the dis-
appointing delivery is due to an overloaded agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities. 
Still, a key issue has been the lack of determined political action”( High Level Group 2004). 
In our view, larger number of goals would not have to be a problem if the aims were really in-
terconnected and followed the same path. The fact that sometimes these goals were in conflict 
with each other while there were no stable priorities made the job particularly difficult. As it was 
mentioned earlier, the objectives and targets were multiplied in such a number that it became un-
feasible for the European Commission to review and assess them altogether. This seems to be an 
effect of bureaucratic activism that aimed at replacing poor coordination and insufficient political 
leadership of the process. 
7.2. Cooperation and leadership 
What were the reasons for such poor coordination? As mentioned above, the Open Method of 
Coordination, used in the Lisbon Strategy has no formal enforcement means at its disposal. There-
fore, only tasks voluntarily chosen and accepted by the member countries can be achieved under 
the OMC. The only pressures on countries can be exerted through mutual information and as-
sessment. This method of coordination proved so far to be efficient only in cases when a particular 
action was not in an area of conflicts among participants. But it was rather inefficient in cases when 
the interests of member countries differed seriously. Countries are not willing to take part in the 
„blaming and shaming” process because of fear to be criticized by other countries in the case of 
differing interests (Notre Europe 2005). Finally, when countries do not clearly see a common inter-
est in implementing a given change, the national governments will not be really committed to con-
vince their parliaments and citizens to such changes and the action will remain on paper. 
But the OMC method cannot bear responsibility for the failure of many important Strategy’s 
goals. It should be stressed that stricter, traditional community methods of coordination applied 
throughout the European Union have not prevented, in some cases, a quasi-outsider behavior of 
countries. The best example is the inability to fully implement the Maastricht Treaty and the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact (SGP) that should force the member countries toward larger responsibility in 
their public finance systems. In this case, two largest EU countries have disregarded a regular 
Community law for several years. Another example is the slow pace of transposition of the Com-
munity laws onto national legislation, which was stressed earlier. Simply, in these cases there is 
not enough commitment to act as a Community member rather then as a national government. 
Therefore, one may suspect that the main cause of the failure to reach some of the Strategy’s im-
portant goals (for example, completing of the internal market) is the lack of ownership of these re-
forms by the respective member countries. 
Thus, the OMC does not deserve all the criticism which was recently offered (Verhofstadt 
2005). It is simply an innovative coordination method that is appropriate for voluntary actions within 
member states.  
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7.3. Reform ownership and the political economy of reforms 
We now arrive at the following issues: why it is so difficult to introduce reforms that are well 
founded and would obviously lead to more growth and prosperity for all? Why governments are 
often reluctant to take ownership of and responsibility for such reforms and to act for the „common 
good”? The calls for „acting together” have rarely been effective. 
One has to recall that politicians are first of all responsible toward their national constituency, 
which has elected them for a limited time, and have to act in accordance with the priorities of their 
voters. When the „common European good” stays in conflict with these short-term and local priori-
ties they tend to act along the wishes of their own constituency and not in accordance with the 
„would-be” European constituency. As the experts of Notre Europe argue, ”in more abstract terms, 
the problem with Lisbon is that it aims for producing public goods with widespread externalities for 
which no ownership exists, as national government are accountable for domestically produced 
public goods but not yet for European public goods” (Notre Europe 2005). The European Commis-
sion, as a „natural” institution to address these issues, cannot do so unless its authority in produc-
ing these goods is clearly established. 
The best example for such case is the current problem with the opening of the services mar-
ket. The voters of more developed and high-wages countries are not willing to open up their local 
markets for other services providers, fearing the competition of entrepreneurs from less developed 
and low-wage countries. The unfair argument of social dumping (Sinn 2001) has been raised 
against the „cheaper” providers. It means in reality that the service providers from the richer coun-
tries could be forced to diminish their prices, because of this potential competition. Voters who 
benefit from the closed market would not easily accept loosing such privileges. The politicians fear-
ing the loss of their support fight for keeping the barriers of the services market as long as possi-
ble. In this process, there is no discussion on the new jobs that could be created through the liber-
alization, on the higher productivity of services that would follow such changes and finally on the 
benefits of all consumers that would result from the competition and decline of prices. 
The truth is that each serious economic reform has to do with the redistribution of rents and the 
potential losers are not willing to relinquish their privileges (Koromzay 2003). On the other hand, 
the potential beneficiaries are often not conscious of their possible gains and the politicians fail to 
inform them and to raise their support. 
In our view, this is the more general cause of the deficits in accomplishment of some important 
goals of the Lisbon Strategy so far. Mr. Borroso, the new President of the European Commission is 
well aware of the existence of these „established, vested interests in all sectors of society” and 
calls in his speeches for a support by the beneficiaries of such reforms, first of all among consum-
ers and users. He also opposes the general interest of all Europe against „both sectional and na-
tional attempts to undermine it”(Borroso, 2005). But will his voice be heard?  
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8. The „new life” of the Strategy? 
Recently, the European leaders announced the need for „reinvigoration” or „revitalization” of 
the Lisbon Strategy. The report of the high level group, chaired by Wim Kok, pointed out the defi-
cits in its realization and searched for its causes. It stressed that the Lisbon ambitions should not to 
be given up; quite the contrary, they are now more appropriate then ever. But one should choose 
the most important priority, which is generally perceived as „more growth and employment”. Other 
objectives should be subordinated to this most important goal. The development of the knowledge 
society was treated as importantly as before, the issue for completing the internal market and im-
proving the climate for business was stressed next. There was also an explicit statement for keep-
ing the social obligations and caring for social cohesion, however not against the main goals of the 
Strategy but in agreement with them (High Level Group 2004). 
The official position of the European Commission (European Commission 2005) before the re-
cent spring meeting has accepted, to a large extent, the direction of the Wim Kok report. It calls for 
more focus (better prioritization), more simplicity and streamlined activities, better coordination and 
the necessity to mobilize popular support for reforms. The report particularly stresses the priority of 
growth and job creation, but strongly underlines the issues of making Europe a „more attractive 
place to invest and work”. These issues include: extending and deepening the Single Market, en-
suring open and competitive markets inside and outside Europe, improving European and national 
regulation, expanding and improving European infrastructure. This more complex and open ap-
proach to the growth factors in the renewed Strategy can only be welcomed. One can find new 
ideas in the knowledge and innovation issues, for instance the planned revision of the state aid 
rules in providing more financial support and easing access to financial means for R&D and inno-
vations, particularly for young and innovative companies. There are novel concepts for institutional 
shape of the research and innovation sector (Innovation Poles and i2010: European Information 
Society). The contribution to strong European industrial base through new technology initiatives 
has been signaled. The employment issues have been tackled in a typical way for the Lisbon 
Strategy, i.e. from the supply side (adaptability, flexibility, and initiatives for the unemployed and 
women to return to employment and for the older people to stay longer in employment). The mod-
ernization of social protection systems (most important pensions and health care systems) is now 
undertaken in a slightly more concrete way in the context of strengthening the employment policies 
and caring for investment in the human capital. 
On the coordination side, there is a new idea of preparing state National Lisbon Programs for 
growth and jobs by each member, reporting to the Community only on this one program and ap-
pointing a member of government in charge of coordination of the Lisbon Strategy. Clear roles for 
the institutions at the European level and new governance of the whole process have been pro-
posed and the importance of involving the social partners and informing the people has been un-
derlined (European Commission 2005). 
The preparatory work to the spring European Council has accumulated many arguments and 
suggested tools for the reshape of the LS and its higher effectiveness. But it seems that the meet- 
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ing has not delivered the expected results. It was dominated by the very politicized discussion on 
the services directive and by the issue of reforming (or rather diluting) the SGP. The very important 
and timely questions of re-directing the LS at some chosen priorities have not found enough atten-
tion. Yet, in a short time after the spring Council, it is too early to assess its entire effects. 
9. Conclusion 
Taking into consideration all abovementioned arguments, one can conclude that it would be 
unfair to proclaim the Lisbon Strategy a failure or even a mistaken initiative. It helped to set direc-
tions of action to modernize the economy at least for countries, which were interested in taking 
such direction. It helped to assess progress and a country’s individual position in this progress. Fi-
nally, it helped to recognize the real situation of the European economy and to find the measures 
that must be taken in order to meet this challenge. The first five years of its implementation was a 
learning process which helped to better understand the need for further European reforms. For the 
new accession countries the Lisbon Strategy is an important guide in search of appropriate tools in 
structural economic reforms. 
Therefore, one should not give up the Lisbon Strategy but rather try to find better, more effective 
ways of its realization. The core issues of pushing the Lisbon agenda forward are now the fully com-
pletion of the single market (including the services and financial market), the improvement of the 
regulatory environment of business and the further deregulation of the labor market. A successful 
action in these three areas would open up new opportunities for growth and employment in Europe. 
Recently, the new European Commission undertook new initiatives in order to reinvigorate the 
Strategy in giving it more focus, simplicity and shape. But its final success will depend on taking 
real ownership of the reforms by the member states and will rest on mobilizing popular support for 
the changes proposed by the Strategy throughout the European Community. 
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